{"id":4551,"date":"2020-04-30T10:51:33","date_gmt":"2020-04-30T01:51:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.01.asiapress.org\/rimjin-gang\/?p=4551"},"modified":"2022-05-16T18:01:10","modified_gmt":"2022-05-16T09:01:10","slug":"forpro3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.02.asiapress.org\/rimjin-gang\/2020\/04\/recommendations\/forpro3\/","title":{"rendered":"\uff1cN. Korea Pro Report (Part 3)\uff1e How is N. Korea\u2019s Economy Faring in the Face of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Continued Sanctions? A Look at the Regime\u2019s \u201cState Smuggling\u201d Operations"},"content":{"rendered":"
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People and vehicles gather at dusk on the North Korean side of the border in preparation for a smuggling operation. It is unclear if the bus is being used to ferry customs officials and security officers. Filmed in November 2019 by KBS<\/p><\/div>\n

After strong sanctions were imposed by the U.N. Security Council, the Kim Jong-un regime put much effort into running smuggling operations at the Chinese border. Taking control of these operations, North Korea\u2019s administrative, customs, and security agencies were mobilized to smuggle goods over land and at sea. With COVID-19 shutting the border, however, what is the state of smuggling operations currently? ASIAPRESS investigated the issue, working with partners both in China and North Korea.<\/p>\n

Part1 >>><\/strong> \uff1cN. Korea Pro Report (Part 1)\uff1e How is North Korea\u2019s Economy Faring in the Face of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Continued Sanctions?<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u25a0 Smuggling along the 1,400 kilometer border<\/h2>\n

The total length of the China-North Korea border is 1,400 kilometers. The border is almost entirely defined by 2 rivers, the Yalu River and the Tumen River.<\/p>\n

The Chinese government, in an effort to block entry of refugees and combat theft, murder, drug smuggling, and weapons smuggling by border-crossers, began installing barbed wire fences along the river about a decade ago. Since 2014, entry across the Tumen River has been entirely blocked with barbed wire. Meanwhile, along the narrower stretches of the Yalu River, there are iron fences set up to block entry. The North Korean side has also covered much of the border with barbed wire as well, mainly due to concerns of its own citizens escaping.<\/p>\n

Musan County and Hoeryong City in North Hamkyung Province were once the most common spots for refugees to escape into China. With security much tighter now, these areas have become more difficult places to cross the river. The most popular spot for smuggling, meanwhile, is just outside of Hyesan City, along the upper stretches of the Yalu River. Boats are also used for smuggling along the middle stretch of the Yalu River in Jagang Province and along the lower stretches of the river in North Pyongan Province. In addition, smuggling takes place ship-to-ship out at sea off the west coast, as will be described momentarily.<\/p>\n

Next page :The structure of \u201cstate smuggling\u201d...<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u25a0 The structure of \u201cstate smuggling\u201d<\/h2>\n

Small-scale smuggling by civilians along the Yalu River has continued over recent years. After international sanctions were strengthened in 2017, however, state agencies came to dominate the world of smuggling. Known in North Korea as \u201cstate smuggling,\u201d government agencies control smuggling, placing trading companies in charge of day-to-day operations.<\/p>\n

The structure of state smuggling can be explained thusly. In the past, powerful organizations such as the military and the Party conducted their own economic activities. The Kim Jong-un regime, however, wanted to put control of such activities under the authority of the Cabinet. The regime therefore strengthened \u201cRoom 39,\u201d an organization under the Workers\u2019 Party that would work solely to raise funds for the regime, overseeing trade companies smuggling with China. Management and oversight of operations would be conducted by administrative agencies in partnership with each province\u2019s trading bureau.<\/p>\n

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Map of North Korea. Produced by ASIAPRESS<\/p><\/div>\n

With trade faltering due to sanctions, North Korean trading companies turned to smuggling. Labelled \u201cstate smuggling,\u201d operations were undertaken with the approval of the regional trading bureaus. Chinese counterparts in smuggling operations, however, were not state agencies but private companies.<\/p>\n

A reporting partner investigating the rise of \u201cstate smuggling\u201d in Ryanggang Province said, \u201cIn order to ensure that there are no irregularities during the smuggling operations, customs officials, secret police, and border guards are all present. The customs officers check the quantities of the smuggled goods- they refer to it as \u2018mobile customs.\u2019 The security officers are there to make sure that drugs, South-Korean made products, and foreign dramas are not being smuggled in along with other goods.\u201d The reporting partner concluded that state agencies have cut local residents out of the profits from smuggling.
\nNext page :South Korean broadcaster, KBS, films smuggling...<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u25a0 South Korean broadcaster, KBS, films smuggling<\/h2>\n

On January 4 2020, South Korean broadcaster, KBS, released footage of a smuggling operation taking place at night. Incidentally, it was thanks to ASIAPRESS reporting partners in North Korea and China that KBS knew where to film the operation.<\/p>\n

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As the sun goes down, large trucks appear on the North Korean side of the river. On this day, it appeared that minerals were smuggled. Filmed in November 2019 by KBS<\/p><\/div>\n

KBS originally filmed the smuggling operation in late November of last year. Following information provided by ASIAPRESS reporting partners, the film crew set up in a certain spot along the Chinese side of the Yalu River. As the sun went down, large dump trucks and freight vehicles gathered on the North Korean side of the river. As the Yalu River was still frozen over, a bulldozer was brought in to dig into the riverbank and create a ramp for the dump trucks to drive down.<\/p>\n

Items designated for smuggling by state agencies change from time to time. It was said that the molybdenum minerals were the most commonly smuggled item last fall. Other popular contraband included dried shredded squid and seafood caught off the east coast. Imported from the Chinese side were buses, trucks, passenger cars, rebar, cement, and gasoline.<\/p>\n

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Bulldozers set to work clearing parts of the riverbank for trucks to drive down onto the frozen Yalu River. Filmed in November 2019 by KBS<\/p><\/div>\n

A Chinese partner of ASIAPRESS spoke of his impression when conducting an investigation in August 2018, saying \u201cIt\u2019s not just that the goods are not going through customs, it\u2019s that everything is being smuggled. I\u2019ve never seen such large-scale smuggling operations conducted entirely in the open. Many North Korean officials came to China to consult with Chinese businessmen. I think there were hundreds of them in all.\u201d<\/p>\n

Chinese authorities turn a blind eye to smuggling but are not directly involved. Border security, though still quite strict, seems to loosen or tighten the reins of the crackdown depending on current relations with North Korea or other international factors. Even when enforcement is relaxed, the amount of goods smuggled in this way is quite limited and the cost is high for both parties. Compared to regular trade, the smuggling operations are not efficient and profit margins are much lower.
\nNext page :Transshipments of coal...<\/strong><\/p>\n

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The upper reaches of the Yalu River became the hotspot for smuggling due to the narrowness of the river. Photograph of Hyesan City taken from across the river in Changbai County, Jilin Province, China in August 2013 by ASIAPRESS<\/p><\/div>\n

\u25a0 Transshipments of coal<\/h2>\n

In February 2020, the UN Security Council\u2019s North Korea Sanctions Committee released an annual report to the media with particularly noteworthy sections on North Korean transshipments of coal.<\/p>\n

On February 12, Kyodo News and Jiji Press reported, \u201cFrom January to August of 2019, North Korea smuggled about 3.7 million tons of coal worth an estimated total of $370 million. About 2.8 million tons of coal, roughly 70% of the total, is believed to have been exported by transshipment between North Korean and Chinese vessels at sea. In addition, North Korea exported at least 1 million tons of sand, worth a total of $22 million to Chinese ports. The United States claimed that North Korea is, in turn, receiving imports of refined oil by transshipment. This amount is said to exceed the sanction resolution\u2019s annual import cap of 500,000 barrels several times over.<\/p>\n

It is hard to believe that petroleum refiners were not aware that 3.7 million tons of coal had been smuggled by transshipment. It would have taken a 10,000-ton cargo ship to make 370 voyages to receive all the coal. Cranes at the Chinese ports would have also taken considerable time to unload the coal after each transshipment. The scale of such an operation would have made it near impossible to avoid surveillance by satellites and aircraft. Video evidence of the transshipments, collected and released by Japan\u2019s Self-Defense Forces, however, only shows hoses being used to transport liquid contraband between ships.<\/p>\n

ASIAPRESS reporting partners in North Korea have conducted a number of investigations of large coal mines around South Pyongan Province and North Hamkyung Province. These local investigations, however, have shown that North Korea\u2019s mines do not currently appear to be in full operation.<\/p>\n

More information is needed to determine whether or not coal is being smuggled via transshipment at the scale suggested by the UN Sanctions Committee\u2019s annual report.<\/p>\n

\u25a0 Transshipments of seafood<\/h2>\n

Seafood is also said to be actively smuggled off the west coast of North Korea through transshipment. A Korean-Chinese resident of Donggang, China, 40 kilometers from Dandong, Liaoning Province, serves as an interpreter for ones of the ships involved in smuggling. According to him, seafood purchased at sea from North Korean fishing boats varies from season to season and ranges from shellfish to crabs to frozen, dried, or live fish.<\/p>\n

To contact North Korean vessels at sea, Chinese ships use North Korean-made mobile phones provided by the North Koreans themselves. After meeting at sea or on a small island, the Chinese smugglers will check the quantity, quality, and price of the North Korean goods. According to the interpreter employed by the smugglers, the ship for which he worked was relatively large and had hired the services of 4 interpreters in total.<\/p>\n

In 2018, shortly after seafood became subject to international sanctions, it was said that North Korean smugglers requested Chinese counterparts to provide South Korean-made cosmetics and clothing. Demand for these luxury items suddenly stopped in 2019, however, when they were made subject to a crackdown. Like \u201cstate smuggling\u201d operations at the northern border, North Korean ships are also said to be supervised by customs officials, party officials, and security officials. This did not perturb the Korean-Chinese interpreter, however, who said, \u201cI got close to the North Korean sailors and would drink and play games with them.\u201d<\/p>\n

It is hard to know the exact scale of the seafood smuggling but dozens of smugglers, large and small, are said to operate from Donggang. Freshly-caught seafood is said to be sold in markets and restaurants of Dandong and Shenyang, as well as distributed wholesale to various parts of China. However, according to the Korean-Chinese interpreter, transshipments of seafood have been stopped completely due to Chinese regulations and North Korean quarantine measures put in place to stop the spread of COVID-19. (ISHIMARU Jiro)<\/p>\n

\u203b ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.<\/p>\n

Part4 >>><\/strong> \uff1cN. Korea Pro Report (Part 4)\uff1e How is N. Korea\u2019s Economy Faring in the Face of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Continued Sanctions? A Look at the Exploitation of Women Working Overseas<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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